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Abstract 
In a supply chain, the importance of information elicitation from the supply chain players is vital to 
design supply chain network. The rationality and self-centredness of these players causes the information 
asymmetry in the supply chain and thus situation of conflict and non-participation of the players in the 
network design process. The supply chain players’ non-participation or reluctance to participate in supply 
chain contract is due to the dynamics of the system evolving with many competitive players in supply 
chain. In this paper, a game theoretical dynamic pricing model has been proposed to elicit the information 
from the players. With the objective of maximizing the social utility, efforts have been made to value 
behavioural issues of supply chain. On the other hand, the reluctance of player due to the information 
asymmetry is measured in the form of inertia experienced by the players due to anxiety and dynamics in 
the market. Distinguishing cases based on level of risk and variety of product are considered to show the 
effect of inertia on social utility and corresponding output for each echelon of supply chain. The paper 
provides supply chain managers an efficient decision making ability to achieve conflict-free outcome with 
the maximum utility. 
Keywords: Multi-echelon supply chain model, dynamic pricing, supply chain formation, revenue 
management, inertia. 
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A supply chain is a system of organizations or enterprises performing operations on raw materials until 
reaching the customer in the form of finished product. A standard serial supply chain consists of multiple 
echelons where every echelon consists of one or more players. Players in each of these echelons are 
considered as rational and egotistical in nature. This implies that every player has the objective to 
maximize his/her own profit and choose an appropriate strategy accordingly. Sometimes, the optimal 
strategy chosen by one player may conflict with others’ choice of optimal strategy whilst designing 
supply chain network. This results in conflicts between echelons of supply chain. In game theory 
literature, this situation refers to non-equilibrium. One way to achieve the equilibrium is by designing the 
supply chain efficiently for the outcome, which is acceptable to all the players in supply chain, namely the 
social outcome. The design for efficient outcome is possible through a strategy with the help of incentives 
for the supply chain players (e.g. Laffont and Martimort (2009); Mas-Colell et al. (1995)). This activity of 
designing supply chain is called Supply chain formation. Many authors have defined the supply chain 
formation in the perspective of designing supply chain, such as in Walsh and Wellman (2000) it is 
referred as the process of bottom-up assembly of complex production systems and determining the 
structure and terms of exchange relationship, and in Narahari and Srivastava (2007), it is defined as 
identifying a set of activities in supply chain operations and its allocation to the 
partners/suppliers/members of supply chain. 
The supply chain formation is then viewed as the systematic design of efficient supply chain to avoid the 
conflicting situation(s) among players between consecutive echelons. In cooperative supply chain, it is 
referred as the system in which the supply chain players make mutual agreement about setting the strategy 
in supply chain. Systematic and synchronized operations between the players can avoid this conflict. 
However, in the non-cooperative supply chain system, the mutual agreement becomes difficult resulting 
in conflict in the supply chain. In this paper, we are dealing with non-cooperative environment of supply 
chain with the motive of maximum throughput. The supply chain throughput measured as total utility 
gain defines the quantification of satisfaction level of supply chain players. In analyzing these utilities, it 
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may appear that the players in supply chain are reluctant to participate in the supply chain formation 
process that is based on the social outcome. In this paper, this reluctance is refereed as inertia of the 
player. The objective of this paper is to model this inertia for different settings in supply chain and 
analyze the impact of this inertia on the supply chain outcome and total utility of the supply chain earned 
during the supply chain formation process. To cover the wide spectrum of supply chain players and for 
variety of products, this paper considers cases with three types of players and analyses the utility with 
high-price and low-price products or services. After this study, a decision maker will be able to control 
the behavioural issues of the supply chain players and accommodate the inertial adjustment in the total 
throughput.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the theoretical background 
required of this study. Section 3 reviews past work on this topic and covers wide prospective of supply 
chain formation. Section 4 presents model for demand, inertia and also the constraints for optimization 
problem to be solved for the supply chain formation. In section 5, the experiments designed and results 
are discussed to that demonstrates the inertia and its effects on utility for entire supply chain. Section 6 
gives some of the managerial implications from this paper. Section 7 concludes the paper with future 
research directions. 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1 Utility and social utility function 
In economics, as defined earlier, utility measures the level of satisfaction of a player over the possible 
strategies to choose in the contract. When it comes to individual satisfaction, then utility becomes 
subjective measure and thus difficult to quantify. There exists another concept derived from utility 
analysis called social utility that leads to social outcome. In the supply chain formation problem, the 
social utility measures the satisfaction of the enterprises for the social optimal outcome of supply chain 
formation process. The role of the supply chain manager is to design the supply chain in order to 
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maximize the total utility of supply chain combining each echelon’s utility as an objective function for 
social outcome. This social utility analysis for supplier-buyer tier of supply chain can be referred to as 
combined form of individual utilities (e.g. Kogan and Tapiero (2007)). Panchal and Jain (2011a), with the 
help of real life case example, have shown that the social utility outperforms in comparison with 
individual utilities of supply chain players.   
Most of the times, the utility or in some cases social utility is a function of single parameter (e.g. Wurman 
and Wellman (1999); Walsh and Wellman (2000); Narahari and Srivastava (2007)). In other words, the 
social utility function is single dimensional measure of satisfaction over all possible singleton strategies. 
In case when a decision has to be taken over strategy set consisting more than one dimension or 
parameter, one has to consider all the important dimensions while modelling utility function. In the 
particular case of serial supply chains, the two important operational decisions are quantity and price per 
unit. On introducing the rationality, these operational decisions become the strategic parameters in utility 
analysis. Hence, along with individual utility, the social utility also expressed as a function of quantity 
and price per unit: uso(q, p). Thereby, the desirable outcome is ),(  pq , which will satisfy the argument 
of social utility giving the maximum throughput in comparison with any other strategic mix of (q, p). 
Equation 1 represents this definition of social outcome with social utility.  
 ),(),(),(:),(argmax),(
),(
pqupqupqpqupq so
pq
    (1) 
2.2 Inertia in supply chain 
The notion of inertia exists in supply chain formation or any trading process. Su (2009), has defined 
inertia as the inherent tendency to refrain from making purchase or trade. Inertia in social utility is defined 
here as the reluctance level to change in the way of trading for social outcome. A person, who does not 
have motivation to change trading policies, has a high inertia while dealing with supply chain formation. 
Conversely, a person who changes quickly or motivated to change has a minimal inertia. As a supply 
chain manager, it becomes easy to handle the supply chain network related issues with less inertial player. 
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The level of inertia depends on the level of risk the players are willing to take. Higher the risk, higher is 
the inertia of the players and vice versa.  
The inertial effect of players on supply chain formation is an important issue for the decision maker. In a 
full-fledged supply chain system, the decision maker has the tendency to retain the supplier/s from 
previous decision epoch under the assumption of “level of trust”. Given the condition of trusting the past 
suppliers, the total utility earned in the supply chain might be less than expected. For example, the 
retained supplier may offer the same product with high price by raising the stakes of market demand to 
the decision maker or on buyer may ask the seller the same product with low price. These different 
interests of enterprises due to inertia in the supply chain creates the conflict in the decision making 
process. Modelling and analyzing the inertia will help to understand the major hurdle in designing supply 
chain (Su (2009)). The then defined utility function should be adjusted to inertial effects for efficient and 
pragmatic approach of supply chain formation. Inertia in utility represents the loss of utility due to the 
reluctance of the players. The objective of supply chain formation is to maximize the total utility taking 
into account the inertial effects on the total utility gain of supply chain players. 
2.3 Risk and inertia in supply chain 
Risk and inertia in the supply chains are closely related. The major categories of supply chain players are 
classified based on their level of risk or risk taking ability in the supply chain: Risk-seeking, Risk-neutral 
and Risk-averse. The risk-seeking players are willing to take the risk of changing the trading strategies 
even for expensive products. For example, in FMCG sector presence of many opportunity markets 
minimizes the risk of changing trading policies. On the contrary, the risk-averse players are highly 
reluctant to take the risk of changing strategy in trading expensive as well as non-expensive products. For 
example, the highly expensive products like ammunitions, fashion goods face the high risk from the 
players in changing the trades. The third category of the players is the Risk-neutral players who are 
neither too reluctant nor favouring the trading policies in supply chains. For example, manufacturing 
industries trading with raw material suppliers have invariable risk in the supply chain. The classification 
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of players on risk level and classification of products on the price per unit level help forming the supply 
chain for efficient outcome.  
2.4 Novelty of the proposed methodology 
The proposed methodology for the supply chain formation is unique in identifying the supply chain 
players’ behaviour in the supply chain and modelling it for the efficient decision making. The three cases 
considered here are identified based on the level of risk covering wide variety of the supply chain cases. 
The methodology for development of supply chain formation process has two paradigms: strategy making 
and supply chain optimization. Although these two paradigms are different from each other, the objective 
of both approaches is to improve the efficiency in supply chain decision making process. The strategy 
making paradigm uses game theory for developing the equilibrium strategy for the supply chain players. 
Whereas in optimization the inputs provided by the players are used to give back the output in the form of 
optimal value of parameters or dimensions. In game theoretic paradigm, each induced game has its 
corresponding optimization problem. The formulation of this optimization problem is crucial in achieving 
efficient outcome. Modelling the players’ behaviour in the optimization problem is unique feature of 
proposed methodology where the formulated optimization problem is based on the novel approach of 
game theory. The objective function in the proposed methodology is to maximize the utility with inertial 
adjustments in each echelon of supply chain.  
3. Literature review 
3.1 Review on supply chain formation 
The previous work on supply chain formation can be classified in four different categories based on the 
methodologies used. Figure 1 describes the major methodologies developed for the process of supply 
chain formation. The channel contract, in general, is the mutual agreement between the network players to 
form a contractual equilibrium. The usefulness of the contractual equilibrium has been revealed by some 
of the researchers working on computer networks (e.g. Niyato and Hossain (2007); Lee et al. (2006); Tsay 
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and Agrawal (2004)). The structural and commercial point of view suggests that the supply chain 
networks and computer networks are similar. This approach combines a bargaining solution of supply 
chain and individual incentive constraints, which helps in identifying the relation in which players 
negotiate and outcomes of long-term contractual relationship (Watson (2007)). In the computer network 
design architecture, the multi-dimensional utility used by Lee et al. (2006) is function that formulates 
quality of distributed data with two parameters: amount of data transfer and reliability of data. In the 
coordinated supply chain system, Ryan et al. (2012) have analyzed the utility based on price and quantity 
as decision variables in the dual channel supply chain. On comparing the equilibrium solutions for 
individual and integrated system of supply chain, the contractual approach shows the potential 
improvement in the throughput. However, the behavioural aspect of supply chain players is not been 
considered. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------------ 
Another approach for the supply chain formation that leads to cooperative system is Negotiation. 
Negotiation is the predominant tool for solving conflicts of interest (Jain and Deshmukh (2009)). Weber 
et al. (1998), describe the use of two multi-criteria analysis tool, multi-objective programming and data 
envelopment to compare two or more suppliers to make decision of supplier selection with negotiation. 
Like in Qi et al. (2007), the negotiation models developed in the process of supply chain formation have 
limitations about strategies of players becoming predictable. To avoid this, it is required to design the 
dynamic knowledge inference system that is adaptable according to knowledge variation as human 
cognition and thinking (Jain et al. (2009)). Jain and Deshmukh (2009), have proposed a fuzzy-logic based 
negotiation procedure to select the supplier or form the supply chain.  
The process of supply chain formation can be stimulated with promotional policies like quantity discount. 
This is an effort to come up with equilibrium price and quantity for the conflict-free outcome. Cho et al. 
(2009), have used optimal pricing approach to stimulate the demand or sales in two-level supply chain 
This paper is published in Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, under the reference Gajanan Panchal 
Vipul Jain, Naoufel Cheikhrouhou, Matthias Gurtner. 2017. Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, 1 1-20, 
which should be cited to refer to this work. DOI : 10.1057/s41272-017-0094-0 
 
problems. The importance of the optimal pricing modelling is also realized when there is new product 
waiting for launch or at least in its transition phase (Li and Graves (2012)). Similarly in Ovchinnikov and 
Milner (2012), the end-of-period discounts modelling can be viewed as the dynamic pricing approach in 
the presence of buyer learning. Other important policies like feedback Stackelberg strategy (He et al. 
(2009)), group purchasing (Hu et al. (2012)) and holding the order for market anxiety (Zschocke et al. 
(2012)) uses the optimal pricing criteria for designing the network (for some supply chain network). 
One more important methodology used in supply chain formation is the equilibrium analysis of game 
theoretic model of supply chain. The most important task before finding the equilibrium solution is to 
formulate the game. The efficient formulation of the game leads to the unique equilibrium solution. 
Wurman and Wellman (1999), have considered this problem as the allocation of total discrete demand 
from the buyer to supplier with the differential price: the competitive equilibrium bundle. The authors 
have established that competitive equilibrium bundle price always allocate the total demand efficiently 
among the suppliers. Wellman et al. (2001), have extended this idea to use price, derived from the bidding 
protocols, to form a market mechanism that can provide a competitive equilibrium. The problem of 
finding out the competitive equilibrium is the decentralized decision making problem where the supply 
chain players choose the optimal local response (Walsh and Wellman (2000)). This may lead to the 
mismatched local and global outcome in the supply chain. It is very difficult to form a mechanism that 
leads to the unique outcome of price and quantity in multi-dimensional utility analysis. However use of 
different auction mechanisms has shown the possibility of achieving efficient mechanism (e.g. Che 
(1993); Beil and Wein (2003); Parkes and Kalagnanam (2005); Levin et al. (2009); Perrone et al. (2010); 
Rao et al. (2012); Wang (2013)) .  
3.2 Review on inertial amendments in utility analysis 
In this paper, one extension in the literature on supply chain formation is to model the supply chain 
players’ behaviour; especially the reluctance in the supply chain formation. The importance of using the 
previously defined inertia and its adjustment have been realized by few of the researchers (e.g. Cachon 
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and Swinney (2009); Levin et al. (2009); Su (2009); Zhao et al. (2012)). Cachon and Swinney (2009) 
have considered three types of consumers (buyer) on the basis of their behaviour in the supply chain; 
myopic, bargain-hunting and strategic consumers. The authors have analyzed different strategies like 
quick-response capabilities and no quick-response capabilities in designing the supply chain network 
based on investment. Levin et al. (2009) have modelled the strategic behaviour of the supply chain 
players using the stochastic dynamic game theory approach. The motive of achieving the equilibrium 
price (subgame-perfect equilibrium) in dynamic settings of supply chain shows that the strategic 
consumer has huge impact on the revenue gain if players’ dynamics is ignored. Unlike above, Su (2009) 
has provided both positive and negative impact of inertial consumer on profits. The author has provided 
the recommendations in the form of dynamic pricing policies to cope up with the behavioural or inertial 
buyer. Similarly, in Zhao et al. (2012), the consumer behaviour to wait before purchasing is considered as 
inertial strategy from the consumer. The dynamic pricing problem is used to derive the optimal pricing 
policies in this environment. The problem is analyzed with respect to inertia depth (extent of inertia) and 
breadth (probability of consumer affected by inertia). The marginal effect of inertia depth on the total 
revenue earned is decreasing whereas a marginal effect of inertia breadth on the firms’ optimal prices is 
increasing.   
After scanning plethora of the literature on supply chain players’ behaviour for supply chain formation 
process, we have found that consumer inertia have potential impact on the profit or revenue gained in the 
supply chain. The modelling inertia for different cases is vital in making the efficient supply chain 
operations. The classified cases in the literature are general rule base criterion. It is still required to link 
these classifications with the level of risk the players are willing to take. It is also learned from the 
literature that it is required to analyze the threshold on the underlying parameters for the auction 
mechanism used in the supply chain formation process. The motivation for this paper is to use the 
dynamic pricing modelling approach to model the inertia in the supply chain and derive the threshold 
analysis of the underlying parameters. This paper addresses the basic research questions in supply chain 
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formation process. How inclusion of inertia affects the utility and corresponding outcome? Is it worth to 
consider the inertia while supply chain formation process modelling? How the parameters behave with the 
induced dynamics for different cases stated? To answer these questions, this work comes up with the 
formulation of the complete problem of multi-echelon supply chain formulation problem. The dynamic 
pricing problem has the objective to maximise the total utility gain subject to the constraints like discount 
allowed in the dynamic environment of supply chain.   
4. Model formulation 
Consider the single product which can be offered to the end user through supply chain echelons i ( Ni ). 
The trading over price per unit and quantity parameter is conducted in the closed channel between any 
two echelons. The supply chain formation process aims at achieving the socially acceptable optimal 
decision, i.e. social outcome. This optimal decision based on utility analysis is difficult in presence of the 
inertia from the players towards the social outcome. As a result, this reluctance level is affecting value of 
the objective function; here the total utility gain. The inertia (Γ) is defined as the reluctance level of the 
player and is quantified as the loss in the total utility earned in each echelon of the supply chain. In this 
section, topological model of the supply chain formation problem is presented which includes demand 
modelling based on the players’ valuation, inertia modelling and discount modelling. 
It is important to consider major constraints in this problem, e.g. in our case the allowed discount (di) in 
each echelon is one of the major constraint of the problem. The modelled discount function is piece-wise 
linear for a range (j) of values of quantity and price per unit. And this discount function value should not 
exceed a certain limit (Maximum discount,b ). Panchal and Jain (2011b) have observed the practice of 
piecewise linear discount function in one of their case studies while modelling the social utility function. 
Moreover the discount function is concave with two parameters, quantity and price, which instead 
referred as piece-wise surface function; this also suggests that there is unique maximum discount allowed 
in specified range of quantity and price. Regarding the utility functions, their quasi-linearity is assumed. 
Let the utility in ith echelon be the function of more than one parameter/dimension; quantity proposed qi 
This paper is published in Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, under the reference Gajanan Panchal 
Vipul Jain, Naoufel Cheikhrouhou, Matthias Gurtner. 2017. Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, 1 1-20, 
which should be cited to refer to this work. DOI : 10.1057/s41272-017-0094-0 
 
and offered price pi along with the inertia of the player Гi. In Equation 2, the quasi-linear form of utility 
function is represented. 
Nipqpqu iiiiiiii  ),(),,(    (2) 
The physical interpretation of Equation 2 is that the ith echelon’s utility is linear with inertia but non-linear 
with the utility exclusive of inertia. The non-linear part of the utility function is of multi-dimensional 
form which is function of underlying parameters.  
4.1 Demand model 
Let there be a single supplier s and a single buyer b in two-tier supply chain. While deciding the 
respective strategies, buyer and supplier express the initial willingness for buying and selling, 
respectively. The willingness of buyer considers his/her own margin, whilst seller’s willingness is over 
selling underlying product or service. Let ),( ss pq and ),( bb pq  be two possible offers from the supplier 
and buyer, respectively. The supplier and the buyer decide these parameters on the basis of their own 
individual valuations. Figure 2 represents the distribution of individual utilities of supplier and buyer 
uniformly distributed within the population of 0 to 1. The conflict in the individual interest affects not 
only the valuation but also the respective demands. The willingness of supplier and buyer comes with any 
price greater than Ps and less than Pb, respectively. And this willingness becomes the respective demand 
from the supplier and buyer Qs and Qb, respectively.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 here 
------------------------ 
Both players want to maximize their profits. The demand for any possible outcome ),( ss pq and ),( bb pq  
is ]1[ ss pQ   and ][ bb pQ   for 10  sp and 10  bp , respectively (Chiang et al. (2003)). The 
monopolist supplier supplies the exclusive buyer at a wholesale price, w, and incurs a cost per unit, cs, that 
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includes the cost of manufacturing and in-bound and out-bound logistics. Their corresponding profits (per 
unit) are determined by Equation 3. 
)1)(( sss pcw  or )1)(( bss pcw    (3) 
and the profit for the buyer is 
)1)(( ssb pwp  or )1)(( bbb pwp    (4) 
When combining the two profit equations (3 and 4) for the social utility which gives us the optimal 
parameters (qso, pso). If both the firms have decided to work synchronized towards the social 
outcome ),( soso pq , then the profit would be 
)1)(( sos
soso pcp       (5) 
Putting Equation 5 in Equation 2, the social utility becomes 
soso
s
sosososososo pcpqpqu  )1)((),,(   (6) 
The social utility in Equation 6 corresponds to the outcome which is socially accepted by the player in the 
supply chain. In some cases, it is assumed that there is demand with certainty for the social utility which 
is agreeable for the players involved in it (i.e. ( 1)1(  sop ).  
4.2 Inertia model 
Consideration of inertia in the utility analysis is possible through; in certain percentage loss in the utility 
or formulating the inertia as a function of underlying parameters. Former way of inertial adjustments is 
more convenient option however not the best possible way because of the subjectivity. Aforementioned 
concept of inertia can be identified in three different classes of supply chain players based on the level of 
risk; Risk-seeking, Risk-neutral and Risk-averse. The assumed loss in Risk-seeking, Risk-neutral and 
Risk-averse classes is 10%, 50% and 90%, respectively. Another way for considering inertia in analysis is 
formulating the inertia function with the help of historical data of quantity and price (multi-dimensional 
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inertia). This historical data represents how the quantity and price have been traded in the past which 
signifies conservative nature of the trading process. The historical distribution of quantity and price is 
assumed to follow the normal distribution with mean quantity and price representing mostly traded data. 
In case of normal distribution, variance represents the level of risk the players are willing to take. More 
the variance less is the risk for the player and vice versa. Sometimes, the skewed distribution is also 
preferable for the players who choose specific range of quantity and price. For example price per unit and 
quantity can be assumed to follow positively and negatively skewed distribution interchangeably to 
captured biasness of players for particular range of price per unit and quantity.  
The behavioural analysis of the two parameters is captured with the help of simple regression analysis. 
The regression function is observed as the extent of reluctance from the players in the past. Using this as a 
base, one can accommodate the conservative natures of the players in the supply chain. For the simple 
case, the inertia is considered as a loss of revenue earned from the trading. So the loss in the revenue or 
can be modelled with conventional model of inertia used in general analysis ( iii pq  ). On plugging 
the regression function of quantity and price, the final inertia function is multiple order function of 
underlying parameters. The resultant optimization problem is the non-linear constrained optimization 
problem with two variables; price and quantity.  
4.3 Discount modelling 
The discount di, in general, is the pricing policy worked out to seek the participation of the inertial player. 
To facilitate the unique maximum discount for the trading, it is important to model the discount function 
as a concave function. However it is very difficult to accommodate the smooth concave function for the 
discount as there exists caps/bounds on both price and quantity (Hobbs and Pang (2007)). The more 
practical and convenient way to model the discount is by assuming piece-wise linearity. Like in this 
paper, in the case of two parameters discount function is the piece-wise surface function, each piece in the 
range of quantity and price represents the maximum discounts allowed in that range. This discount 
function is the constraint in the formulated optimization problem. The maximum discount availed in the 
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ranges of prices and quantities have the cap on it in order to construct the approximate concave shape of 
discount function. The ranges of the p and q are the break points for the discount function. The discount 
in jth range is a linear function of p and q. The piece-wise surface function approximates the required 
concave function of discount. In the following formulation, Equation 7 is the piecewise surface function 
(approximate concave) for the allowed discount in different ranges of p and q. Equation 8 and 9 define the 
range for the price and quantity within which the corresponding discount function is implemented. 
Equation 10 and 11 captures the phenomenon of negotiation process in which increasing price decreases 
the quantity (demand) is represented. 
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Where, Jj is the range or the intermediate brake point in the approximate concave function of 
discount. 
q
j
q
j ul ,  and 
p
j
p
j ul ,  are the lower and upper range of j
th range of quantity and price, respectively. 
Also cba ,, , b j  is the maximum discount offered in the range j and  1,0, jj yx . Equations 12 to 
15 are required to make the piecewise surface function to give unique value of discount while using it for 
the optimization problem of utility maximization. Here pi
j and qi
j are the dummy variable created for the 
piecewise surface function. On solving this optimization problem one of these variables become the 
global variable pi and qi , respectively. 
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The shape of this discount function in the ranges of price and quantity will look like as shown in the 
Figure 3. The shaded part of the curved surface shows the feasible areas for the discount function because 
of the nature of the traded quantity and price in defined supply chain formation process (increasing 
quantity decreased the price and vice versa). 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 3 here 
------------------------ 
Equation 16 gives the objective function for the entire problem. This objective function is weighted 
average value of total utility gained from the trade considering the minimal expected value of utility from 
the trade (ai0). The weights are each parameter (ai’s) of Equation 16 represents the preference value of 
those parameters (quantity, price, social utility). In Equation 16, it is considered that the players in each 
echelon will have preference over different parameters. The first term on right-hand side in this equation 
is the non-traded utility that represent the situation where qi=0 and pi=0. In other words, it is the lower 
bound of utility exercised when there are no trades. The second and third term refers to the preference 
given to the quantity and price, respectively. This preference varies with the type of product considered 
for the trading. For the high-price products these coefficients are, 12 ii aa   and vice versa for low-price 
products its 21 ii aa  . The coefficient for the fourth term in Equation 16 measures the preference for 
social utility for ith echelon. This newly formulated objective function for the complete supply chain is to 
maximize the utility of each echelon with the inertial effects on social utility including the preferences 
choice of the each player over the underlying parameters in the supply chain formation process.  
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where, ),,( iii
so
i pqu  is the social utility defined in Equation 6. Here, 
 i  is the echelon of supply chain 
 qi    is the quantity of the echelon i 
 pi is the price of the echelon i 
 
i
mc  is the cost to manufacture the product 
 i  is the i
th echelon’s inertial effect 
 ai0  represents the lower bound for the utility to ith player in supply chain 
 ai1 ith player’s weight for the quantity while modelling utility  
 ai2  ith player’s weight for price per unit while modelling utility 
 ai3  ith player’s weight for the social utility while modelling utility 
To see the effect of inertia on the utility and also to analyze the three cases of the player, it is required to 
design distinguished experiments. The two major tests or experiments designed in this paper are; High-
price products/services and Low-price products/services. The Section 5 covers design of these 
experiments and results of designed experiments with assumed inputs for the optimization problem. 
5. Experimental design 
5.1 Experiment for modelling inertia 
Three cases based on risk level of the players are considered to represent the Inertia: Risk averse, Risk 
neutral and Risk seeking. Figure 4 shows the histograms of the normally distributed generated data for 
quantity in all three cases considered for analysis (similar histogram can be shown for price data). Mean 
of quantity and price for these cases is same 50qi  and 50
p
i and standard deviation is 
10,5,2qi and 10,5,2
p
i  for risk-averse, risk-neutral and risk-seeking players, respectively. The 
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concept of inertia is implicit in these histograms for the different classes of players. For risk-averse player 
the configuration he/she chooses is around the mean of the parameters, which depicts the higher inertia of 
that player. Similarly, the risk-seeking player with more options of trading has less inertia.  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4 here 
------------------------ 
Figure 5 shows the results of the regression between price and quantity. It is found that there exists the 
linear regression with quantity and price per unit.   
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 5 here 
------------------------ 
Equation 17 gives the regression between these two parameters. It gives the inertia for these cases, where 
the regression of two parameters is accommodated. 
)( pqii pq        (17) 
and the inertia function is given by Equation 8, 
i
pq
iii ppqp  )(
2
    (18) 
The regression functions of the three cases are different from each other in coefficient of the regression 
function. Although it is simple linear regression between the two parameters, for the case of modelling 
behaviour using the dynamic pricing is justified. These cases are related to Price-response function, 
demand function etc. Referred in Phillips (2005),  for some cases, the assumed skewed distribution for the 
q and p has the similar regression analysis outcome.  
5.2 Design of experiments for optimization 
Two distinguished cases to analyze the utility with the inertial effects of the players are considered here. 
For these two cases on product price (high price and low price), the values of the coefficients are assumed 
as inputs for the optimization problem. The assumed values of the inputs are based on the specific 
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observations made in the procurement process of considered Indian Railways Catering and Tourism 
Corporation (IRCTC) Limited industry. The differentiation between the two cases is clear from the trend 
in the values of these coefficients. Table 1 shows the input values of the coefficients in high-price 
products cases for the supply chain of five echelons. The value for the basic utility expected from the 
trading (ai0) is increasing as the product value is added towards downstream of supply chain. For this 
case, initially there is more weight (ai1) for price based trading to avoid the accumulation of total price at 
the end customer. On the other hand, less weight (ai2) for the quantity based trading, as there are some 
expected losses (scrap) of quantity during the process of building the products. The weight for the social 
utility (ai3) can be assumed uniform throughout each echelon of the supply chain. This is because the 
social outcome is equally important for all the echelons of supply chain. Also in the low-price product 
case all the inputs are assumed in solving the optimization problem. The rest of input values are self-
explanatory for the high-price products and also for increasing price decreases quantity phenomenon.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------ 
Similarly, Table 2 shows the inputs for the low-price products considered in the optimization problem. 
These values are different from the Table 1 for the reason of lower price of the products. The values in the 
Table 2 depicts the importance or seriousness of the players in each echelon for each of the parameters. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 here 
------------------------ 
Similarly, coefficients for the discount function are assumed based on the above two cases. Table 3 and 
Table 4 provide the input for the discount function in Low-price and High-price products cases. The input 
values in Table 3 and 4 are based on the case studied by Panchal and Jain (2011b). 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 here 
------------------------ 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 here 
This paper is published in Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, under the reference Gajanan Panchal 
Vipul Jain, Naoufel Cheikhrouhou, Matthias Gurtner. 2017. Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, 1 1-20, 
which should be cited to refer to this work. DOI : 10.1057/s41272-017-0094-0 
 
------------------------ 
To see the effect of inertia on utility an experiment (Test I) is designed. Test I has two parts: inertia as a 
function of the underlying parameters modelled for the cases (Equation 18) and inertia as a percentage 
loss in the utility. The implication of the Test I is on the decision for the inertia consideration in utility 
analysis. The impact of inertia along with the level of risk needs to be analyzed in the supply chain 
formation process. However the inertia model given in Equation 18 does not differ for risk-based cases. 
To see the impact of level of risk in the supply chain Test II is designed where the losses due to inertia are 
assumed for the defined cases.  
5.3 Results of optimization  
Using the inputs for Test I and Test II, the formulated optimization problem in Section 4 is solved for 
optimal parameters and corresponding utility of the entire supply chain.   
Test-I: Utility analysis with fixed percentage loss and the modelled form of inertia, which is function of 
two parameters (q, p). For this test, Table 5 gives the comparative analysis of utilities with modelled form 
of inertia and the utility with assumed percentage loss (The percentage loss in the utility increases with 
downstream echelons of forward supply chain) for high-price product. The level of risk towards the 
downstream of supply chain increases due to the anxiety of the market at consumer end, especially for the 
new product. 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 here 
------------------------ 
From Test I results, it is observed that the modelled inertia in this paper always result in higher utility as 
compare to assumed percentage loss in utility for each echelon i. However there is no significant 
difference in the optimal parameters in both the cases. Even so the impact on utility is important to 
consider in the supply chain formation. Similarly, Table 6 represents result for low-price product. In this 
case as well, the modelled inertia gives the maximum inertia as compare to the assumed losses one. 
------------------------ 
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Insert Table 6 here 
------------------------ 
From these results in Test I, it is observed that the modelled inertia will always end up in giving 
maximum inertia. The tested model of inertia for high-price and low-price product shows the similar 
observation. 
Test II: The significant difference in the utility analysis of Test I improvise the supply chain formation 
process by considering modelled inertia. However, the effect of inertia with risk-based player is only 
observable for assumed percentage loss in the utility. Here there are three types of players with assumed 
percentage of loss in the utility; Risk-seeking-10%, Risk-neutral-50% and Risk-averse-80 or 90%. Table 
7 shows the results for low-price products in quantity, price and utility tuple format for each of the 
echelons i.  
------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 here 
------------------------ 
Similarly, results for the high-price products are shown in Table 8. In both the cases in Test II, it appears 
that there is significant difference in optimal utility as well as the optimal parameters for three different 
cases. The difference in the optimal parameters is predominant from the risk-averse case. To see this 
difference the graphs are plotted against these cases (see Figure 6). 
------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 here 
------------------------ 
Figure 6 gives the comparative analysis of low-price and high-price products for risk-based cases of the 
player. On the basis of these plots, it is very clear that the inertia has the noticeable influence on the 
utility, which is sensitive to underlying parameters. This information can be used to decide the threshold 
values in the auction mechanism for supply chain formation process. 
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 6 here 
------------------------ 
This paper is published in Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, under the reference Gajanan Panchal 
Vipul Jain, Naoufel Cheikhrouhou, Matthias Gurtner. 2017. Journal of Revenue & Pricing Management, 1 1-20, 
which should be cited to refer to this work. DOI : 10.1057/s41272-017-0094-0 
 
5.4 Research findings and implications 
From these results, following are some important findings related to the decision making process of 
supply chain formation can be derived: 
 In Test I, the inertia effect has been tested on the total utility earned in the supply chain. In this 
test, it is found that the modelling inertia as a function of the underlying parameter ( ),( iii pq ) 
results in more utility as compare to the assumed losses in the utility gainG i . The significant 
difference between the two utilities suggests the use of modelling inertia in the utility analysis. 
 The second remark on inertia analysis in Test I is related to the optimal parameters of supply 
chain formation process. The optimal parameters in two variations do not show major change. 
However it does not mean the two variations in inertia are insignificant. In fact, this gives 
motivation for player in supply chain for not changing the preferences over the strategy base 
(quantity and price). 
 In Test II, the result for the three cases based on risk shows that the inertial effect on the utility is 
substantial in Risk-neutral and Risk-averse players. It is also observed that the optimal outcome 
pair of supply chain formation process only differs for risk-averse players.  
 In Test II, it is also observed that the influence of parameters on the utility along with their 
sensitivity for inertia. From Figure 6, it is observed that the inertia is price sensitive, especially 
for high-price products.  
These results are important for a decision maker to analyze the supply chain in perspective of inertial 
players and design the supply chain for the social outcome. Figure 7 shows the framework for the supply 
chain formation process in which modelled inertia is considered to model supply chain players’ 
behaviour. This framework is designed for the IRCTC case presented in Panchal and Jain (2011b).  
------------------------ 
Insert Figure 7 here 
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------------------------ 
The implications of discussed results on the decision making process are can be summarized in following 
two major points. 
 The higher utility with the modelled form of inertia as compared to the individual utility implies 
the importance of the modelled form of inertia to the decision makers of supply chain, who seeks 
to achieve the maximum utility in supply chain. The result of which, the decision makers can rely 
on the supply chain formation process with modelled form of inertia. 
 The second major implication from the results is the price-sensitivity of inertia. Among the two 
parameters considered, price per unit should be given higher preference while negotiating with 
players. This threshold analysis of the two parameters helps in designing the reverse auction 
mechanism for the supply chain formation process. From the results, the imminent auction 
mechanism should have higher threshold for price per unit as compared with quantity. 
6. Managerial insights 
Managerial implications of the obtained results are used to answer these questions. In this paper, three 
cases based on the level of risk and for two types of product covers wide spectrum in supply chain of 
Indian Railways Catering and Tourism Corporation (IRCTC) Limited. The same analysis should work for 
the organization with heterogeneous products, dynamic environment where the decisions are based on the 
price per unit and quantity. This analysis may also apply to organizations with variety of risky players in 
supply chain. For instance, in IRCTC supply chain, presence of the dominant buyer induces the risk in the 
non-dominating suppliers. Following questions may rise in the management responsible for the decision 
making to which the proposed methodology is answerable.  
What is the most important concern of the players in supply chain? This is important to know reason 
behind the lack of participation from the players in supply chain. The elicitation of this information needs 
much more experience and maturity. In dynamics of supply chain, it is very difficult to achieve this 
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maturity. The modelled inertia in this paper not only identifies the cause of this non-participation but also 
helps in finding out the efficient optimal solution. The different cases studied in this paper find out that 
the inertia of the players is price sensitive. In other words to answer the question to supply chain manager, 
the players have concern over the price than the quantity of interest. In developing the supply chain 
formation, the supply chain manager need to create policies, which are price oriented that the quantity 
enabled.  
 Risky players or just an obstruction in efficiency? The risk-based cases considered in this paper are 
considerate of all the possible horizons of player’s behaviour. The inertia model presented in this paper is 
unique for all the cases of risk. Also the utility of the combined echelons of supply chain with inertia is 
the maximum with respect to utility with constant losses in utility as inertia. This is demonstrated with all 
the possible cases of risk and type of products to make the job of supply chain manager easier.  
Is the supply chain formation with modelled inertia increases efficiency? Efficiency in the supply chain 
comes with the more utility with as minimum conflicts as possible. The utility analysis in this paper 
designed for objective function of maximum utility and the outcome with this maximum utility is the 
conflict free outcome. From the results in both the experimental designs, it is found that the utility is the 
maximum in all the cases of risk as well as the price based cases for the modelled inertia in the supply 
chain. In supply chain of organizations like IRCTC, it is required to design supply chain for all the 
players without giving undue advantage to particular organization or a dominant organization for that 
matter.  
7. Conclusion and future scope 
This paper analyzes and models the inertia of the players which represents the conservativeness of the 
player in the supply chain trading. The results obtained for the comparison of the utilities in different 
settings through these tests shows that the inertia of the players’ to be price sensitive. In other words, 
while making any decision in supply chain network design or supply chain formation, it is required to 
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give more attention for the price per unit in high risky environment of supply chain players. The 
efficiency of proposed supply chain formation process in this paper is improved in the form of total utility 
gain of supply chain. This is considered to be contributing significantly in the supply chain formation 
literature. Another major contribution of the study in this paper is in terms of threshold analysis of 
parameters in supply chain formation process. The imminent auction mechanism can use this result in 
deciding the threshold on the two parameters. For example, the high-price product should have more 
concern for the price per unit parameter than the quantity in the dynamic and risky environment of supply 
chain. The novelty of the work in this research paper is based on the above facts portrayed from the 
results produced from the tests conducted.  
In this paper, the regression function is similar for all the cases of risks and also the modelled inertia gives 
much more utility gain as compare to the assumed percentage losses in utility. For this reason, different 
model of inertia may lead to some of the interesting and more general cases. This extension will add more 
value for the application point of view of supply chain formation. There is also possibility to extend the 
work by adding more constraints other than discount provided in the supply chain formation process. The 
possible constraints are related to the capacity allocation, demand at each echelon of supply chain and the 
material balance between the different supply chain echelons. The application point of view for this work 
can cover global supply chain where the behavioural issue of the wider spectrum of players is more 
concerned.  
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Figure 1 Classification of methodology for supply chain formation problem 
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Figure 2 Distribution of consumption value of Supplier and Buyer 
 
Figure 3 Feasible area of the discount function in the supply chain formation 
 
Figure 4 Histogram of quantity for three cases of players based on the risk 
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Figure 5 Regression of quantity (q) against price per unit (p) 
Table 1 Inputs for the high-price product 
Echelon i ai0 ai1 ai2 ai3 
i
mc  
q
i  
p
i  
1 500 0.10 0.90 0.10 10 30 3000 
2 1000 0.30 0.70 0.10 20 25 4000 
3 1500 0.50 0.50 0.10 30 25 6000 
4 2000 0.70 0.30 0.10 40 20 9000 
5 2500 0.90 0.10 0.10 50 16 13000 
 
 Table 2 Inputs for the low-price product 
Echelon i ai0 ai1 ai2 ai3 
i
mc  
q
i  
p
i  
1 50 0.10 0.50 0.05 1 30 30 
2 100 0.20 0.40 0.05 2 25 40 
3 150 0.30 0.30 0.05 3 20 60 
4 200 0.40 0.20 0.05 4 15 90 
5 250 0.50 0.10 0.05 5 10 130 
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Table 3 Inputs for the discount function in the case of low-price products 
i aj (j =4) bj (j =4) Bj (j =4) 
1 -1 -0.50 0.50 1 1 0.50 -0.50 -1 0 10 10 0 
2 -0.50 -0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.25 -0.25 -0.50 10 15 15 10 
3 -1.50 -1 1 1.50 1.50 1 -1 -1.50 15 20 20 15 
4 -2 -2.50 2.50 2 2 2.50 -2.50 2 20 25 25 20 
5 -2.50 -2.75 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.75 -2.75 -2.50 25 40 40 25 
  
Table 4 Inputs for the discount function in the case of high-price products 
i aj (j =4) bj (j =4) Bj (j =4) (103) 
1 -1 -0.50 0.50 1 1 0.50 -0.50 -1 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.10 
2 -0.50 -0.25 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.25 -0.25 -0.50 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.12 
3 -1.50 -1 1 1.50 1.50 1 -1 -1.50 7 8 8 7 
4 -2 -2.50 2.50 2 2 2.50 -2.50 2 15 20 20 15 
5 -2.50 -2.75 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.75 -2.75 -2.50 40 60 60 40 
  
Table 5 Result of test I for the inertia analysis with high-price products 
i qi pi Utility with modelled inertia ),( iii pq  Γ (%) Utility with assumed inertia 
1 30 4000 16062.31 10 14862.50 
2 25 5000 16957.50 20 14862.50 
3 25 7000 22429.55 30 20683.75 
4 30 7530 26749.92 40 24503.00 
5 25 12000 33597.44 50 30610.00 
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Table 6 Result of test I for the inertia analysis with low price product. 
i qi pi Utility with modelled inertia ),( i
p
i
q
i
  Γ (%) Utility with assumed inertia 
1 30 40 131.45 10 125.65 
2 30 50 197.96 20 183.60 
3 25 70 262.22 30 237.12 
4 35.25 59.75 324.26 40 285.00 
5 33.31 66.68 376.02 50 324.70 
 
Table 7 Result of Low-price product case with tuple of outcome (qi,pi,ui) 
Echelon i Risk-seeking Risk-neutral Risk-averse 
1 (30,40,125.65) (30,40,102.25) (20,50,81.90) 
2 (30,50,190.89) (30,50,162.00) (25,55,133.62) 
3 (25,70,253.87) (25,70,220.37) (20,80,187.70) 
4 (35.25,59.75,314.48) (35.25,59.75,275.18) (35.25,59.74,235.87) 
5 (33.31,66.68,365.80) (33.31,66.68,324.70) (33.31,66.68,283.60) 
Table 8 Result of High-price product case with tuple of outcome (qi,pi,ui) 
Echelon i Risk-seeking Risk-neutral Risk-averse 
1 (30,4000,14862.50) (30,4000,10080.50) (20,5000,6996) 
2 (25,5000,15712.50) (25,5000,10732.50) (20,5500,7048) 
3 (25,7000,20683.75) (25,7000,13718.75) (20,8000,8696) 
4 (30,7530,24503) (30,7530,15515) (20,10000,8998) 
5 (25,12000,30610) (25,12000,18660) (25,12000,9697.50) 
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Figure 6 Comparative analyses of low-price and high-price products for risk-based cases of supply chain 
players 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 7 Framework for the supply chain formation process with inclusion of inertia of supply chain 
players 
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